Excerpt:
But even if we are assured that a “normal” person will be prompted by the social instincts and that those instincts are typically flanked and reinforced by a set of moral emotions, we still do not have a truly normative account of moral obligation. There is nothing in Darwin’s own account to indicate that the ensuing sense of guilt—a guilty feeling—is indicative of actual moral guilt resulting from the violation of an objective moral law. The revenge taken by one’s own conscience amounts to a sort of second-order propensity to feel a certain way given one’s past relation to conflicting first-order propensities (e.g., the father’s impulse to save his child versus his impulse to save himself). Unless we import normative considerations from some other source, it seems that, whether it is a first or second-order inclination,one’s being prompted by it is more readily understood as a descriptive feature of one’s own psychology than material for a normative assessment of one’s behavior or character. And, assuming that there is anything to this observation, an ascent into even higher levels of propensities (“I feel guilty for not having felt guilty for not being remorseful over not obeying my social instincts…”) introduces nothing of normative import. Suppose you encounter a man who neither feels the pull of social, paternal or familial instincts nor is in the least bit concerned over his apparent lack of conscience. What, from a strictly Darwinian perspective, can one say to him that is of any serious moral import? “You are not moved to action by the impulses that move most of us.” Right. So?
The problem afflicts contemporary construals of an evolutionary account of human morality. Consider Michael Shermer’s explanation for the evolution of a moral sense—the “science of good and evil.” He explains,
By a moral sense, I mean a moral feeling or emotion generated by actions. For example, positive emotions such as righteousness and pride are experienced as the psychological feeling of doing “good.” These moral emotions likely evolved out of behaviors that were reinforced as being good either for the individual or for the group.2Shermer goes on to compare such moral emotions to other emotions and sensations that are universally experienced, such as hunger and the sexual urge. He then addresses the question of moral motivation.
In this evolutionary theory of morality, asking “Why should we be moral?” is like asking “Why should we be hungry?” or “Why should we be horny?” For that matter, we could ask, “Why should we be jealous?” or “Why should we fall in love?” The answer is that it is as much a part of human nature to be moral as it is to be hungry, horny, jealous, and in love.3Thus, according to Shermer, given an evolutionary account, such a question is simply a non-starter. Moral motivation is a given as it is wired in as one of our basic drives. Of course, one might point out that Shermer’s “moral emotions” often do need encouragement in a way that, say, “horniness,” does not. More importantly, Shermer apparently fails to notice that if asking “Why should I be moral?” is like asking, “Why should I be horny?” then asserting, “You ought to be moral” is like asserting, “You ought to be horny.” As goes the interrogative, so goes the imperative. But if the latter seems out of place, then, on Shermer’s view, so is the former.
One might thus observe that if morality is anything at all, it is irreducibly normative in nature. But the Darwinian account winds up reducing morality to descriptive features of human psychology. Like the libido, either the moral sense is present and active or it is not. If it is, then we might expect one to behave accordingly. If not, why, then, as a famous blues man once put it, “the boogie woogie just ain’t in me.” And so the resulting “morality” is that in name only.
In light of such considerations, it is tempting to conclude with C. S. Lewis that, if the naturalist remembered his philosophy out of school, he would recognize that any claim to the effect that “I ought” is on a par with “I itch,” in that it is nothing more than a descriptive piece of autobiography with no essential reference to any actual obligations.
At this point I want to recommend reading J.P. Moreland's essay on human worth and naturalism he wrote for the book "God is Great, God is Good..." The following ideas and sources are from that essay. I include this summary of human worth and naturalism because I think the moral argument for God has a lot of weight in human dignity and intrinsic worth.
One would think, since naturalism cannot explain the existence of objective morality, it counts as a nod toward Christian theism. Atheist J.L. Mackie acknowledged: "Moral properties constitute so odd a cluster of properties and relations that they are most unlikely to have arisen in the ordinary course of events without an all-powerful god to create them."2 The best scientific naturalism can do is explain what I call "low-end" morality, which is explained partly by kin-selection and reciprocal altruism; it cannot explain intrinsic value, objective moral order, or the high equal value and rights of human persons (high-end morality). Naturalists Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse acknowledge that the best justification for the high equal value of human persons is in the grounding of Judeo-Christian doctrine of the image of God.3 This claim by Singer and Kuhse is acknowledged by many thinkers, most notably by Joel Feinberg. 4
One would think, since naturalism cannot explain the existence of objective morality, it counts as a nod toward Christian theism. Atheist J.L. Mackie acknowledged: "Moral properties constitute so odd a cluster of properties and relations that they are most unlikely to have arisen in the ordinary course of events without an all-powerful god to create them."2 The best scientific naturalism can do is explain what I call "low-end" morality, which is explained partly by kin-selection and reciprocal altruism; it cannot explain intrinsic value, objective moral order, or the high equal value and rights of human persons (high-end morality). Naturalists Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse acknowledge that the best justification for the high equal value of human persons is in the grounding of Judeo-Christian doctrine of the image of God.3 This claim by Singer and Kuhse is acknowledged by many thinkers, most notably by Joel Feinberg. 4
J.P. Moreland writes
The
following skeptical question, Feinberg believes, has never been
adequately answered: why would we treat all people equally in any
respect in the face of manifest inequalities of merit among them? The
simple response "Because we just have such worth" does not answer the
skeptic's query. If "human worth" is real and generic, says Feinberg,
then it must supervene on some subvenient base that (1) we al lhave
equally in common and (2) is nontrivial and of supreme moral worth.
Operating within a naturalistic framework, Feinberg considers several
attempts to delineate that base, and he judges them all to be a failure
because they
- require an entity such as "pricelessness" for which we have no answer as to where it came from and with respect to which one must postulate a problematic, mysterious, intuitive faculty of direct awareness of such an entity;
- are grounded in a degreed property (one that is possessed to a greater or lesser degree) such as rationality (Feinberg takes the potential for rationality to be degreed) which, therefore, cannot do the job of founding equal worth for all;
- simply name the problem to be solved and do not provide an explanation of the problem itself.
At the end of
the day, Feinberg acknowledges that the notion of equal worth and equal
rights for all human persons is groundless and may simply express a
noncognitivist, unjustifiable pro-attitude of respect to ward the
humanity in each person. 5
Feinberg
gives an excellent illustration of the difficulty of grounding equal
value and rights (objective morality) on a naturalistic worldview. It
cannot be done because given naturalism, it's illusory. J.P. Moreland then cites David Hull who is the leading philosopher of evolutionary theory in the twentieth century.
The
implications of moving species from the metaphysical category that can
appropriately be characterized in terms of "natures" to a category for
which such characterizations are inappropriate are extensive and
fundamental. If species evolve in anything like the way that Darwin
thought they did, then they cannot possibly have the sort of natures
that traditional philosophers claimed they did. If species in general
lack natures, then so does Homo sapiens as a biological species. If homo
sapiens lacks a nature, then no reference to biology can be made to
support one's claims about "human nature." Perhaps all people are
"persons," share the same "personhood," etc., but such claims must be
explicated and defended with no reference to biology. Because so many
moral, ethical, and political theories depend on some notion or other of
human nature, Darwin's theory brought into question all these theories.
The implications are not entailments. One can always dissociate "Homo
sapiens" from "human being," but the result is a much less plausible
position. 6
He
(Moreland) goes on to cite atheist James Rachels as claiming, "...a
Darwinian approach to the origin of human beings, while not entailing
the falsity of these notions, nevertheless provides an undercutting
defeater for the idea that humans are made in the image of God and that
humans have intrinsic dignity and worth as such. Indeed, according to
Rachels, Darwinism is the universal solvent that dissolves any attempt
to defend the notion of intrinsic human dignity." 7
Rachels writes:
The doctrine
of human dignity says that humans merit a level of moral concern wholly
different from that accorded to mere animals; for this to be true,
there would have to be some big, morally significant difference between
them. Therefore, any adequate defense of human dignity would require
some conception of human beings as radically different from other
animals. But that is precisely what evolutionary theory calls into
question. It makes us suspicious of any doctrine that sees large gaps of
any sort between humans and all other creatures. This being so, a
Darwinian may conclude that a successful defense of human dignity is
most unlikely. 8
Rachels is
correct. On the naturalistic worldview, "...a successful defense of
human dignity is most unlikely." All you have with naturalism is an
explanation for low-end morality. Naturalism cannot explain the high-end
morality that humans demonstrate, which is behavior that doesn't care
about reciprocal or genetic advantages to the action. Why do people give
blood? The blood is going to help those who the person does not know.
There is no naturalistic rationale for this behavior. Richard Dawkins
concedes that that the Darwinian thesis cannot explain why people give
blood, a fact that he puts down to "pure disinterested altruism." 9
The Darwinian model cannot account for "love your enemies." Or for the
actions of Mother Teresa, or for the good Samaritan model. The Darwinian
model is confined to the realm of self-interest and the essence of
morality operates outside the realm of self-interest. As Dinesh D'Souza
writes, "The whole point of morality is that you are doing what you
ought to do, not what you are inclined to do or what is in your interest
to do. Morality is described in the language of duty, and duty is
something that we are obliged to do whether we want to or not, whether
it benefits us or not." 10
J.P. Moreland finishes his essay with
Naturalists
can't appeal to emergence to solve their problems because (1) this is
just a label for the problem to be solved and not a real solution and
(2) it begs the question against Christian theism in a most egregious
way. It would seem, then, that important features that characterize us
human persons provide evidence that there is a Creator God who made us.
And this is exactly what one would predict if biblical teaching about
the image of God is true. 11
Sources
1. Michael Ruse, "Evolutionary Theory and Christian Ethics," in The Darwinian Paradigm (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 262 - 69
2. J.L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982), p. 115
3. Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, Should the Baby Live? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 118-39.
4. Joel Finberg, Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), pp. 84-97
5. J.P. Moreland, "The Image of God and the Failure of Scientific Atheism," in God is Great, God is Good (USA: Intervarsity Press, 2009), pp. 45-46
6. David Hull, The Metaphysics of Evolution (Albany: State University of New York, 1989), pp. 74-75
7. Moreland, pp. 46-47
8. James Rachels, Created from Animals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 171-72. Cf. pp. 93, 97, 171
9. Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) pp. 230.
10. Dinesh D'Souza, What's So Great About Christianity (USA: Tyndale House Publishers, 2007) pp. 239-240.
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