From Philosophy Now magazine.
All the same he (Hawking) is compelled by the ‘abstract logic’ of his own
doctrinaire science-first approach to push that evidence temporarily out
of sight when declaring the total irrelevance of philosophy for anyone
possessed of an adequate (i.e., scientifically informed) worldview.
Indeed it may be good for philosophers occasionally to remind scientists
how their most productive thinking very often involves a complex
interplay of empirical data, theories, working hypotheses, testable
conjectures and even (sometimes) speculative fictions. Likewise absent
from Hawking’s account is philosophy’s gatekeeper role in spotting those
instances where science strays over without due acknowledgement from
one to another mode, or – as frequently happens nowadays – where certain
evidential constraints are lifted and empirically informed rational
conjecture gives way to pure fabulation.
Besides this, there are supposedly cutting-edge theories which turn
out, on closer inspection, to unwittingly replicate bygone notions from
the history of thought that have been criticised and eventually laid to
rest. Hawking’s book puts forward two such theories. One is his linchpin
‘M-theory’ having to do with the multiple dimensions – eleven at the
latest count – that are taken to constitute the ultimate reality beyond
appearances despite our sensory perception being limited to the
three-plus-one of our familiar spatio-temporal world. On this account
there cannot be a single, comprehensive ‘Theory of Everything’ of the
kind favoured by sanguine types like Steven Weinberg but we can hope to
get a whole range of specially tailored, region-specific theories which
between them point toward the nature and structure of ultimate reality.
The other, closely related to that, is Hawking’s idea of
‘model-dependent realism’ as an approach that makes allowance (as per
orthodox quantum mechanics) for the effect of observation on the item
observed but which nonetheless retains an adequate respect for the
objectivity of scientific truth.
Here Hawking’s argument shows all the signs of a rudderless drifting
between various positions adopted by different philosophers from Kant to
the present. He spends a lot of time on what seems to be a largely
unwitting rehash of episodes in the history of idealist or
crypto-idealist thought, episodes which have cast a long shadow over
post-Kantian philosophy of science. That shadow still lies heavy on
Hawking’s two central ideas of M-theory and model-dependent realism.
They both look set to re-open the old Kantian split between a ‘noumenal’
ultimate reality forever beyond human knowledge and a realm of
‘phenomenal’ appearances to which we are confined by the fact of our
perceptual and cognitive limits. So if Hawking is right to charge some
philosophers with a culpable ignorance of science then there is room for
a polite but firm tu quoque, whether phrased in terms of pots
calling kettles black or boots on other feet. For it is equally the case
that hostility or indifference toward philosophy can sometimes lead
scientists, especially those with a strong speculative bent, not only to
reinvent the wheel but to produce wheels that don’t track straight and
consequently tend to upset the vehicle.
A firmer grasp of these issues as discussed by philosophers during
the past few decades might have moderated Hawking’s scorn and also
sharpened his critical focus on certain aspects of current theoretical
physics. My point is not so much that a strong dose of philosophic
realism might have clipped those speculative wings but rather that
philosophers are well practised in steering a course through such choppy
waters, or in managing to navigate despite all the swirls induced by a
confluence of science, metaphysics, and far-out conjecture. After all,
physics has increasingly come to rely on just the kind of disciplined
speculative thinking that philosophers have typically invented,
developed, and then criticised when they overstepped the limits of
rationally accountable conjecture. Such are those ‘armchair’
thought-experiments that claim to establish some substantive, i.e.,
non-trivial thesis concerning the nature of the physical world by means
of a rigorous thinking-through that establishes the truth (or, just as
often, the demonstrable falsehood) of any statement affirming or denying
it.
No doubt there is room to debate whether these are really (and
remarkably) instances of scientific discovery achieved through an
exercise of a priori reasoning or whether they amount, as
sceptics would have it, to a species of disguised tautology. However
there are just too many impressive examples in the history of science –
from Galileo’s marvellous thought-experiment showing that Aristotle must
have been wrong about falling bodies to a number of crucial
quantum-related results – for anyone to argue convincingly that results
obtained in the ‘laboratory of the mind’ can only impress philosophers
keen to defend their patch. Indeed, there is a sense in which the
scientific enterprise stands or falls on the validity of
counterfactual-conditional reasoning, that is to say, reasoning from
what necessarily would be the case should certain conditions
obtain or certain hypotheses hold. In its negative guise, this kind of
thinking involves reasoning to what would have been the outcome if certain causally or materially relevant factors had not
been operative in some given instance. Hawking constantly relies on
such philosophical principles in order to present and justify his claims
about the current and likely future course of developments in physics.
Of course he is very welcome to them but he might do better to
acknowledge their source in ways of thinking and protocols of valid
argumentation that involve distinctly philosophical as well as
scientific grounds.
This brings us back to the point likely to provoke the most
resistance from those scientists – chiefly theoretical physicists – who
actually have the most to gain from any assertion of philosophy’s claim
to a hearing in such matters. It is that scientists tend to go astray
when they start to speculate on issues that exceed not only the
current-best observational evidence but even the scope of what is
presently conceivable in terms of testability. To speak plainly: one
useful job for the philosopher of science is to sort out the errors and
confusions that scientists – especially theoretical physicists –
sometimes fall into when they give free rein to a speculative turn of
mind. My book Quantum Theory and the Flight from Realism found
numerous cases to illustrate the point in the statements of quantum
theorists all the way from Niels Bohr – a pioneering figure but a
leading source of metaphysical mystification – to the current advocates
(Hawking among them) of a many-worlds or ‘multiverse’ theory. To adapt
the economist Keynes’ famous saying: those scientists who claim to have
no use for philosophy are most likely in the grip of a bad old
philosophy or an insufficiently thought-out new one that they don’t
fully acknowledge.
There is a large supply of present-day (quasi-)scientific thinking at
the more – let us say – creative or imaginative end of the scale that
falls into just this hybrid category of high-flown metaphysical
conjecture tenuously linked to certain puzzling, contested, or at any
rate far from decisive empirical results. Nor is it mere hubris for
philosophers to claim a special competence in judging when thought has
crossed that line from the realm of rational, scientifically informed
but so far unproven conjecture to the realm of unanchored speculation or
outright science fiction fantasy. One has only to pick up a copy of New Scientist or Scientific American
to see how much of the latest thinking inhabits that shadowy
border-zone where the three intermingle in ways that a suitably trained
philosopher would be best equipped to point out. Nowhere is this more
evident than in the past hundred years of debate on and around the
seemingly paradoxical implications of quantum mechanics. Those paradoxes
include wave/particle dualism, the so-called ‘collapse of the
wave-packet’, the observer’s role in causing or inducing said collapse,
and – above all since it appears the only way of reconciling these
phenomena within anything like a coherent ontology – faster-than-light
interaction between widely separated particles.
I shall risk the charge of shameless self-advertisement and suggest
that readers take a look at my book for the case that these are
pseudo-dilemmas brought about by a mixture of shaky evidence, dubious
reasoning on it, fanciful extrapolation, and a flat refusal to entertain
alternative theories (such as that of the physicist David Bohm) which
considerably lighten the burden of unresolved paradox. At any rate we
are better off trusting to the kinds of advice supplied by
scientifically-informed philosophers with a well-developed sense of how
speculative thinking can sometimes go off the rails than the kinds –
including the advice ‘let’s put a stop to philosophy’ – issued by
philosophically under-informed scientists."
Read the entire free article written by philosopher Christopher Norris by clicking here.
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